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EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SHIFT TO "FIRST
INVENTOR TO FILE" IN THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT
John Burke*
It is the sense of the Congress that converting the United States patent system
from 'first to invent" to a system of "first inventor to file" will promote the
progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the
exclusive rights to their discoveries and provide inventors with greater certainty
regarding the scope of protection provided by the grant of exclusive rights to their
discoveries.
Introduction
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act dramatically changed the standard for
obtaining patent rights in the United States by shifting from a "first to invent"
system to a "first inventor to file" system for attaining patent rights in the United
States.2 Prior to the changes made by the America Invents Act, patent rights in the
United States were granted based on a "first to invent" system whereby a patent was
granted to the first individual to conceive of a new invention and reduce it to
practice.3 In other words, only the so-called original or first-in-time inventor could
obtain a patent. This occurred regardless of whether this original inventor was
actually the first individual to file an application for a patent covering the invention
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.4  In instances when a
subsequent (later in time) inventor was the first individual to file an application for
or receive a patent, the original inventor could engage in a process known as an
"interference proceeding" to establish her rights as the first inventor. 5 In contrast,
* I would like to thank Professor David Schwartz for his advice and inspiration. I would also like to thank the
staff of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their assistance throughout the editorial process. Most
importantly, I am forever grateful to my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(o), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100).
2. See id.
3. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("United States patent law embraces
the principle that the patent right is granted to the first inventor rather than the first to file a patent
application.").
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2006) (repealed 2011) (stating a person shall be entitled to a paient unless
"before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this country
by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it"). In other words, a first-filer would
not receive patent rights if an earlier, diligent inventor existed.
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006) (repealed 2011) ("Whenever an application is made for a patent
which, in the opinion of the Director [of the Patent and Trademark Office], would interfere with any pending
application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared and. . . [t]he Board of Patent
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almost every other country in the world awards patents to the first individual to file
for a patent, without considering whether the potential patentee was actually the
first to invent (or conceive of and reduce to practice) the particular subject matter
for which the patent is sought.6 This discrepancy between the method of obtaining
patent rights in the United States and other nations, combined with treaties7
whereby nations have agreed to honor one another's filing dates, created the
potential for applicants filing in one country to obtain favorable treatment over the
applicants filing in another.9
However, under provisions of the America Invents Act, starting on March 16,
2013, patent rights in the United States will generally be granted to the first
inventor to file with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.10  Under this
new system, a second-in-time inventor who independently conceives of an
invention can obtain rights over the invention (rather than the original or first-in-
time inventor) by being the first to file a patent application for the invention.II In
making this change, Congress stated that it intended to uphold the mandate set forth
for the patent system in the Constitution.12 Despite this, allegations persist that the
Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of priority of the inventions . . . ."). Accordingly,
through interference proceedings, any patent rights awarded over a particular invention will be given to the
first-in-time inventor rather than the first inventor to file for a patent.
6. See, e.g., Vito J. DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to
the United States' First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 687-88 (1993) ("Nearly every other
country in the world utilizes a 'first-to-file' system, which establishes priority of invention on the basis of the
earliest effective filing date of a patent application disclosing and claiming an invention."). Notably, after the
Philippines switched to a "first to file" system in 1998, the United States was left as the last nation utilizing
the "first to invent" approach to patent rights. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Small Entities and the "First To Invent"
Patent System: An Empirical Analysis (2005), 1 n.1, http://www.wif.org/upload/0505WPMossinghoff.pdf.
7. For example, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is one such international treaty. See Patent
Cooperation Treaty, art. 11(3), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at
http://www.wipo.int/pctlen/texts/pdf/pct.pdf
8. Filing dates, the dates on which patent applications are filed, are used to determine priority and
thereby establish which of several inventors should be given a patent over a particular invention.
9. See, e.g., Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 883 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("[W]ith adoption of the
Paris Convention, an applicant's rights in one country insofar as they are affected by the filing date of a patent
application could be determined as of the filing date of an earlier filed application in another country if both
countries adhered to the Paris Convention. This was a particular advantage for an applicant in those countries
where, unlike in the United States, the first to file for a patent on an invention is entitled to it even though he
might not have been first to make the invention."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 363 (2006) ("An international
application designating the United States shall have the effect, from its international filing date under article
11 of the treaty, of a national application for patent regularly filed in the Patent and Trademark Office except
as otherwise provided in section 102(e) of this title.").
10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(c). However, some limited exceptions to this general rule
exist. For example:
The owner of a patent may have relief by civil action against the owner of another patent that
claims the same invention and has an earlier effective filing date, if the invention claimed in
such other patent was derived from the inventor of the invention claimed in the patent owned
by the person seeking relief under this section.
Id. § 3(h)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, only actual, independent inventors may obtain patent rights.
11. Id. § 2.
12. Id. § 3(o) ("It is the sense of the Congress that converting the United States patent system from 'first
to invent' to a system of 'first inventor to file' will promote the progress of science and the useful arts by
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries and provide inventors with
greater certainty regarding the scope of protection provided by the grant of exclusive rights to their
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sweeping overhaul of the American patent system contained in the America Invents
Act violates the Constitution.' 3 Contrary to these contentions, this paper argues that
the "first inventor to file" provisions in the America Invents Act are consistent with
the Constitution and uphold Congress's constitutional mandate to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."l 4
This paper analyzes the changes made by Section 3 of the America Invents Act
relating to the switch from a "first to invent" system to a "first inventor to file"
system. Section I of this paper provides a brief overview of the history of the
patent system in America, including both significant legislative changes made to the
patent laws in the United States and some of the significant "first to invent"
decisions made over the past two hundred years. Section II examines several of the
arguments raised against the constitutionality of switching to a "first inventor to
file" system. This paper concludes by analyzing whether the change from "first to
invent" to "first inventor to file" is constitutional and upholds the preferences of the
Framers of not granting monopolies without obtaining significant public benefit.16
In so doing, this paper examines the breadth of discretion granted to Congress in
determining the intellectual property laws for the United States.
I. Background
The framework of patent laws in the United States can only be understood by
examining the historical context in which the laws developed. The roots of the
patent system in America can be traced back to the practice during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in England of allowing the monarch to grant exclusive
commercial monopolies.' 8  Originally, no particular grounds were necessary for
discoveries.").
13. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The First-to-File Provision in H.R. 1249 is Unconstitutional: A Textual
and Historical Analysis, at 6 ("[T]he Constitution authorized Congress only to secure property rights to first
inventors, not commercial monopoly privileges obtained by supplicants of the federal government's favor.").
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Although critics of the America Invents Act have alleged it implements a "first to file" system, the
new approach in the United States should properly be characterized as granting rights to the "first inventor to
file." This distinction is discussed in greater detail below.
16. See, e.g., Great Atil. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The
Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted.").
17. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) ("To comprehend the scope of Congress's
Copyright Clause power, 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic."') (citing New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 57 (1884)
("The construction placed upon the Constitution by [the drafters of] the first [copyright] act of 1790 and the
act of 1802 . . . men who were contemporary with [the Constitution's] formation, many of whom were
members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight. . . .").
18. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (observing that the original Patent Act
"was written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-of the
Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed
by the public."); see also Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1255 (2001) ("The history of patents does not begin with inventions, but




bestowing these monopolies; as such, they were given at the complete discretion of
the monarch, often in exchange for payment.19 Both citizens and members of
Parliament strongly disfavored this practice 20 and in 1623 the passage of the Statute
of Monopolies eliminated almost all government-bestowed monopolies in
England.21 However, in recognition of the value imparted through innovation, the
English Parliament specifically retained the power to grant limited monopolies that
would last a predetermined length of time to inventors over their inventions.22
This was the framework under which the Founders created America's patent
system. Congress's power to grant patent rights, and thus the entire patent system
in the United States, is founded in a single provision of the United States
Constitution23 often referred to as "the Patent Clause."24 This provision states that
Congress shall have the power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."25 Congress's power to grant exclusive
rights-monopolies-is inherently limited. In particular, these rights can be given
only for a limited time. Additionally, unlike the English system, only authors and
inventors may obtain monopolies, and these monopolies are restricted to their own
creations.26 These limitations appear to stem from the Framers' fears regarding the
potential abuses of state-granted monopolies based on their experiences with the
English system.27 Despite these concerns, the Framers recognized the benefits
conferred by limited monopolies when used to promote innovation.28 As explained
19. See, e.g., McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 418 (1878) ("During the reign of Elizabeth it
was the policy of the Crown to raise as little revenue as possible by direct taxation, and as much as possible
by the sale of monopolies.").
20. See, e.g., id. at 419 (observing that the abuse of monopolies for common items had unnecessarily
and drastically increased prices; for example "where salt (before the patent) was wont to be sold for sixteen
pence a bushel, it is now sold for fourteen or fifteen shillings a bushel.").
21. English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, (1623) (eliminating all Crown-sanctioned
monopolies except for prior existing patents); see also Karen E. Simon, The Patent Reform Act's Proposed
First-to-File Standard: Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
129, 131. Following the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, all sanctioned monopolies were
eliminated in England except for the "exclusive privileges" of patents. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1829). It was this sort of specially granted monopoly that served as the basis for the
patent system in the United States, although it was not adopted whole-cloth. Id.
22. Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 18-20.
23. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8) ("[I]t must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision
which authorizes the Congress 'To promote the Progress of . .. useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."').
24. Notably, this clause of the Constitution is also referred to both as "the Copyright Clause" (as it is
also the foundation for copyright protection) or more generally as "the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause." The
clause will be referenced throughout this Note as "the Patent Clause" when referring specifically to the
language referring to patents.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. No perpetual monopolies are granted for intellectual property; instead, only limited monopolies (that
is, monopolies of limited scope and duration) are authorized. See, e.g., Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren,
Perspectives on Patent Claim Construction: Re-Examining Markman v. Westview Instruments Through
Linguistic and Cognitive Theories ofDecisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173, 194 (2004) ("The
key to the patent system's success lies in its limited grant of monopoly . . . .").
27. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154-58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
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by James Madison:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain,
to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States
cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases,
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by
laws passed at the instance of Congress. 29
The rights to such limited monopolies were thus clearly conferred upon inventors as
a means to encourage such individuals to innovate. Under the American patent
framework, patents were given as property rights. In effect, just as a builder could
come to own a piece of physical property by creating it through physical labor, an
inventor could come to own the intellectual property he created through his mental
labor.30 This property rights justification underlying the patent system was perhaps
best stated by Chancellor James Kent as, "[iut is just that [inventors] should enjoy
the pecuniary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labor." 3' Accordingly,
although under the English system patents did not prevent the use of an invention
by the Crown,32 under the American system, the "property in the mind-work of the
inventor" was secured solely to the inventor (and not also to the government). 33
However, not all of the Framers were equally convinced of the benefits
conferred by patents. In particular, Thomas Jefferson believed that "the benefit of
even limited monopolies is too doubtful, to be opposed to that of their general
suppression."34 Thomas Jefferson's views are particularly relevant to an
understanding of the early patent system in America because, as noted by the
Supreme Court, he was the primary originator of that system.35 Jefferson believed
it was necessary to "draw[] a line between the things which are worth to the public
29. Id at 1.
30. See, e.g., 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTS. ON Am. L. 463, 474 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873)
(1826) (referring to patents as being "of original acquisition by intellectual labor."); I ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 260, 266 (1803)
(appendix to vol. 1).
31. KENT, supra note 30.
32. See McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 420.
33. Id. at 417-18. Note that in some special cases, the government may retain the right to utilize the
subject matter of a patent without cost. For example, this may occur if the research underlying the patent was
conducted using government funds. See, e.g., Bayb-Dole Act (Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act),
35 U.S.C. § 200-212 (2006). In general, individuals may recover against infringing uses by the government,
as sovereign immunity has been waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006) (modified 2011).
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt.
35. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7 (noting that Thomas Jefferson was the "moving spirit" of the original




the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."36 Jefferson
explained that "[i]nventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property;"
however, "[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as
an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility . . . ."37
Starting with the passage of the first statutes creating a patent system, patent
law in the United States has stressed that patents should be granted to original
inventors. Congress first enacted laws governing patents on April 10, 1790.38 This
first patent statute explicitly set forth that patent rights could be granted to first
inventors only and further provided for the repeal of any patent not issued to a first
or original inventor. 39  Additionally, the law made clear that patents served as
prima facie evidence that the patent holder was in fact the original inventor of the
patented invention.40 Problems with this approach arose almost immediately, as it
was difficult to determine which of multiple alleged inventors was the true first
inventor.41 Although the idea of awarding patents to the first inventor to file an
application was proposed at a hearing of the Patent Board in April of 1791, the
42proposal was ultimately rejected. Instead, when the second Patent Act was
enacted in 1793,43 a procedure termed an "interference" was created in order to
resolve problems arising when the identity of the original inventor was in dispute.44
After the first-in-time inventor was determined, she would ultimately be awarded
the patent, regardless of whether her application was actually the first application
filed. This change, combined with the consideration and rejection of a "first to file"
system, seemingly reaffirmed the belief that patents could only be awarded to
original inventors. Additionally, although the 1793 Act removed much of the
language of the 1790 Act regarding original inventors, it stressed that patents "not
originally discovered by the patentee" or "surreptitiously obtained" based on the
discovery of another person shall be declared void.45 The concept of patents only
being awarded to the first-in-time inventor persisted through all subsequent patent
acts until the passage of the America Invents Act of 2011. 46
The Supreme Court has consistently supported the idea that the "first to invent"
36. Id. at 9. Jefferson made this comment in light of his many years as member of the patent board.
37. Id. at 8, n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 180-81 (Washington ed.)
(1854)).
38. Patent Act of 1790, § 1, Ch. VII, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790).
39. Id. § 5 ("[I]f it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer,
judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent or patents. . . .").
40. Id. § 6 ("[T]he said patents or specifications shall be prima facie evidence, that the said patentee or
patentees was or were the first and true inventor or inventors, discoverer or discoverers of the thing so
specified. .. .").
41. Simon, supra note 21, at 134-35 (describing an early patent case in which "four individuals applied
for a patent on a steamboat").
42. Id. at 134 (citing P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237, 237
(1936)).
43. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
44. Id at §§ 3, 9, (describing how multiple patent applications for the same invention shall be sent to
arbitration).
45. Id. § 6.
46. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198
(1870); Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1956).
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system is constitutional. 47  Furthermore, the Court has observed that Congress's
powers to grant patents are narrow and strictly constrained by the limits imposed by
the Constitution.48 In particular, the Court has stated that patent laws must accord
with the "inherent requisites" of the Constitution.49  To this end, the Court has
stated that the requirements for patentability are inherently set forth in the Patent
Clause of the Constitution.5 0
II. Analysis
Several arguments have been raised against the constitutionality of a "first to
file" or "first inventor to file" system in the United States. Part A of this section
examines the specific provisions of the "first inventor to file" system implemented
by the America Invents Act. Part B of this section discusses several arguments
against switching to a "first inventor to file" system in America based on the text of
the Patent Clause of the Constitution. Part C addresses those arguments against a
"first inventor to file" system based on the Framers' intentions. Part D justifies the
constitutionality of the "first to file" system implemented by the America Invents
Act.
A. "First to File" Under the America Invents Act
The America Invents Act ("The Act") provides that patent rights will, in
general, be given to the first inventor or group of inventors to file for a patent on a
particular invention.5 1 As such, it is no longer relevant which inventor conceived of
the invention first; priority for patent rights can normally be determined merely by
checking which application was filed first with the Patent and Trademark Office.
To this end, interference proceedings-originally established to determine which of
several inventors was the original inventor-will no longer be used.52  The Act,
however, makes several important distinctions regarding the recipients of patent
rights. Only inventors who actually discovered the subject matter contained in a
47. Although the "first to invent" system has never faced a direct constitutional challenge in the United
States, the language used in Supreme Court decisions indicates the Court's support of such a system. For
example, the Court has stressed that only original or actual inventors could obtain patent rights. See Shaw v.
Cooper, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.) 292, 292 (1833) ("[I]t clearly appears, that it was the intention of the legislature, by a
compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive right in the inventor only . ) (emphasis
added).
48. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 ("The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or
to restrict free access to materials already available.").
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 3.
51. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3. Notably, under the Act, patent rights are still
restricted to inventors. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.") (emphasis added).
52. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(j).
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patent application shall be granted a patent.53  Accordingly, if the subject matter
contained in a patent or patent application belonging to a second-in-time inventor
who filed first was derived from the work of another (earlier) inventor who filed
second, the first-in-time inventor may bring suit to acquire patent rights in her
invention. 54  Additionally, if an inventor chooses to publish the details of his
invention prior to filing a patent application, he is effectively granted priority as if
he had filed a patent application on that date, so long as he actually does file such
an application within one year of the publication date.5
B. Interpreting the Patent Clause: Textual Arguments against First-to-File
As noted above, the Patent Clause states that Congress shall have power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 56 This provision contains several explicit limitations on Congress's
ability to enact patent laws. Specifically, the Patent Clause restricts Congress's
ability to enact legislation regarding the purpose and duration of patents, the
identity of original patent holders, and the subject matter of inventions that may be
patented. In this way, the enumerated powers bestowed by the Patent Clause are
expressly limited in scope.57  The Patent Clause prevents Congress from granting
patent rights to anyone except inventors. Accordingly, the "first inventor to file"
system for patentability implemented in the America Invents Act would arguably be
unconstitutional if the Patent Clause does not allow for patents to be initially
obtained by an individual other than the original (or first-in-time) inventor.
It is relevant to note that a "true" first to file system that did not require the filer
to be an inventor would be clearly unconstitutional, as the Patent Clause explicitly
specifies that only inventors may obtain patents. There is, however, no explicit
limitation that only original inventors may obtain patents in the language of the
provision.5 8  Under this reading of the Clause, the actual first to file system
implemented by the America Invents Act is constitutional, as it does limit who may
obtain a patent to actual inventors in accordance with the text of the Patent
53. Id. § 3(a) (stating that the "term 'inventor' means the individual or, if a joint invention, the
individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter ofthe invention.") (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 3(h)(1) ("Thc owner of a patent may have relief by civil action against the owner of another
patent that claims the same invention and has an earlier effective filing date, if the invention claimed in such
other patent was derived from the inventor of the invention claimed in the patent owned by the person seeking
relief under this section.").
55. Id. § 3(b)(1) (Indicating disclosures shall not constitute prior art if "the subject matter disclosed had,
before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.").
56. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
57. See Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 149 (2005) ("The Intellectual Property Clause is
unique in that it is the only one of the Enumerated Powers where the drafters mandated 'a specific mode of
accomplishing the particular authority granted,' i.e., 'by securing exclusive rights for limited times to authors
and inventors in their respective writings and discoveries."'). Notably, the "IP Clause" refers to the entirety
of Section 8, Clause 8 and provides the foundation for both patent law and copyright law.
58. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating simply that "inventors," rather than "original inventors," may
secure patent rights over inventions).
76 [Vol. 39: 1
2012-13] Examining the Constitutionality of the Shift to "First Inventor to File"
Clause. 59
Despite this, some have argued that the term "inventors" as used in the
Constitution should be interpreted to refer only to original or first inventors.60 At
the time when the Framers drafted the Constitution, at least one dictionary defined
an inventor as "one who produces something new; a devisor of something not
known before." 61 Arguably, one could not be an inventor unless the alleged
invention was, in fact, new-and thus not previously produced or known by
someone else before. Along the same lines, "to discover" was defined as "to bring
to light," "to find out" or "to make known." 62 Presumably, only a first or original
inventor would be in position "to make known" a concept.63
C. Looking to the Framers' Intent: Further Arguments against "First to
File"
This interpretation is supported through the understanding by early American
courts that patents were property rights in an invention obtained through first
discovery, much the same as property rights in land were obtained through first
possession.64 Under the common law approach to property, an individual could
first take ownership of newly-discovered land through possession and subsequently
perfect title through statutorily established procedures.65 Justice Marshall stressed
that rights to inventions were acquired in much the same way.66 He noted "[t]he
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3.
60. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 13, at 14 ("The Constitution and long-established historical practice in
American patent law establish that.. only the first inventor can obtain a patent."); Joe Matal, A Guide to the
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CiR. B.J. 435, 462 n.173 (2012)
("[Ilnventor means first inventor in the Constitution.") (quoting 157 CONG. REc. H4421-22 (daily ed. June 22,
2011) (statement by Rep. Sensenbrenner)).
Further, some lower courts have indicated that the Constitution requires a first to invent system rather than a
first inventor to file system. See, e.g., Benedict v. Menninger, 64 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1933) ("A first
inventor being the inventor whom the Constitution and the law contemplates shall receive award" of patent
rights.). The United States Supreme Court has not directly held whether the use of "inventors" in the Patent
Clause is restricted to "original inventors."
61. Simon, supra note 21, at 140 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, vol. 1 (1787)); see also Edwin Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8 - The Formula
for First-to-Invent, 83 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 641, 643 (2001) ("The plain language of the terms ["inventor" and
"discoveries"] would thus seem to settle the issue, [by] clearly prohibiting any first-to-file system as
unconstitutionally denying actual inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries.") (emphasis added).
62. Simon, supra note 21, at 140; see also Suominen, supra note 61, at 643.
63. Of course, were the original inventor to suppress, conceal, or abandon the invention, a subsequent
inventor would be able to "stand in the shoes" of the true original inventor and make the initial disclosure of
the subject matter of the invention. This possibility is discussed further in Part C of this section.
64. Mossoff, supra note 13, at 11 ("The analogy between the intellectual labor of the first inventor and
the physical labor of a first possessor of land was in fact explicitly drawn by American judges in innumerable
patent cases in the early nineteenth century.")
65. See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (where Justice Marshall
explained "discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession").
66. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) affd, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199
(1815) ("The constitution and law, taken together, give to the inventor, from the moment of invention, an
inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a patent." Furthermore, "this inchoate and
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constitution and law, taken together, give to the inventor, from the moment of
invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a
patent."67 Justice Marshall further explained, "this inchoate and indefeasible
property in the thing discovered commences with the discovery itself and is only
perfected by the patent subjecting the future use of the machine constructed
previous to a patent."68  Accordingly, if rights were secured at the moment of
invention, only the first inventor in time would be able to validly obtain a patent on
an invention. Further, as noted by Justice Joseph Story69 in 1817, "[n]o person is
entitled to a patent under the act of congress unless he has invented some new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used
before.",70
As discussed above, 7 this same understanding that patents should only be
awarded to original inventors was reflected in the wording of the original Patent
Act, which provided that "if it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and
true inventor or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal
of such patent or patents."72 This understanding was further supported by Justice
Story's reasoning in Pennock v. Dialogue.73  Story found that three separate
sections in the 1793 Patent Act restricted patents to first or original inventors.74
Specifically, Justice Story noted that the 1793 Act required (1) patents be granted
for things "not known or used before the application;" (2) that "every inventor,
before he can receive a patent, shall swear, or affirm, that he does verily believe that
he is the true inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, or improvement for which
he solicits a patent;" and (3) that a defense to a suit for patent infringement include
"that the thing thus secured by patent was not originally discovered by the patentee,
but had been in use, or had been described in some public work, anterior to the
supposed discovery of the patentee." 75 Based on this, Justice Story concluded that
only the first inventor should be able to obtain a patent. 76
indefeasible property in the thing discovered commences with the discovery itself, and is only perfected by
the patent subjecting the future use of the machine constructed previous to a patent.
67. Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 873 (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Justice Story is considered "one of the architects of American patent law." Frank D. Prager, The
Influence ofMr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254, 254 (1961). Although
Justice Story only authored about two-dozen decisions in patent cases, his views are considered highly
relevant to a complete understanding of patent jurisprudence in the United States. Id.
70. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) (emphasis added).
71. See supra Background (discussing the requirements in the Patent Act of 1790).
72. Patent Act of 1790 § 5.
73. See 27 U.S. (Pet. 2) at 1.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 19 ("If it were necessary, as it well might be, to employ others to assist in the original structure
or use by the inventor himself; or if before his application for a patent his invention should be pirated by
another, or used without his consent; it can scarcely be supposed, that the legislature had within its
contemplation such knowledge or use.").
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D. Justification for the Constitutionality of the "First Inventor to File"
System: An Examination of the Policy Underlying the Patent Clause
Despite these seemingly strong arguments that the Framers provided only for a
"first to invent" system when the Patent Clause was drafted, a "first inventor to file"
system falls within the constitutional mandate governing patents. Most notably,
language limiting patent rights to only first-in-time or original inventors is absent
from the Patent Clause.77 Had the Framers intended to limit patent rights to only
original inventors, such language could easily have been included within the Patent
Clause itself-especially considering the Statute of Monopolies, from which the
American Patent system drew its roots, did include language limiting patents to
"first and true inventors." Furthermore, although the first two patent acts passed
by Congress implemented a "first to invent" system of patent rights,7 1 this
requirement was not proposed as a Constitutional amendment. This can be seen as
indicating, that while the Framers preferred a "first to invent" system, they did not
consider it the only correct way to bestow patent rights. For example, in noting that
England allowed individuals to obtain patents over ideas at least partially conceived
by others, Justice Story himself observed that although "[t]he law in this country
has not gone quite so far [as England], but I do not mean to say, that there would be
any difficulty in going to that extent."80 In other words, Justice Story necessarily
considered the term "inventors" to be fluid enough to encompass individuals who
relied upon the prior knowledge and experimentation of others in perfecting the
invention. Supreme Court precedent also indicates that the Patent Clause allows
patents to be awarded to subsequent-rather than first-in-time-inventors, so long
as they have independently conceived their ideas.8'
Additionally, the prohibition on obtaining inventions previously known was
seen by some, including Justice Story, to refer to the public rather than to other
inventors. As noted by Justice Story in reference to the limitations in the 1793
Patent Act, "[w]e think, then, the true meaning [of the phrase 'not known or used
before the application'] must be, not known or used by the public, before the
application." 82 In other words, an applicant could not patent something that was
not novel or was obvious. Similarly, as discussed above, Justice Story believed the
77. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
78. See English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, (1623) (granting monopolies over "new
manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures") (emphasis
added). See also Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, Note, The "First-to-File" Patent System: Why Adoption Is Not an
Option!, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 7-8 (2007).
79. See generally Patent Act of 1790; Patent Act of 1793.
80. Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 317 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214).
81. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (9 How.) 477, 497 (1850) ("Yet it would hardly be doubted, if any one
now discovered an art thus lost, and it was a useful improvement, that, upon a fair construction of the act of
Congress, he would be entitled to a patent. Yet he would not literally be the first and original inventor. But he
would be the first to confer on the public the benefit of the invention. He would discover what is unknown,
and communicate knowledge which the public had not the means of obtaining without his invention."). See
also Matal, supra note 60, at 462 (explaining Gayler).
82. Pennock, 27 U.S. (Pet. 2) at 19 (emphasis added).
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1793 Act restricted an individual from patenting something he did not himself
develop, but instead had copied from some other actual inventor. Justice Story
stressed that an inventor should not be able to conceal his invention until others had
developed and implemented similar approaches and then subsequently apply for a
patent, asserting that he himself was the "first and true inventor."83 By implication,
under Justice Story's interpretation, where multiple individuals independently
conceived of the same invention, neither the 1793 Act nor the Constitution would
prohibit the second-in-time inventor from obtaining a patent.
The Supreme Court has held that even under the "first to invent" system, patent
rights were not vested in the first individual to conceive of a new idea. Rather, the
Court held that an individual "is the first inventor in the sense of the patent law, and
entitled to a patent for his invention, who first perfected and adapted [the invention]
to use." 84 As such, patent rights could only be obtained in an invention by reducing
the invention to practice and complying with the procedural requirements set forth
by Congress.85 Additionally, a second-in-time inventor could obtain patent rights
where the first-in-time inventor had failed to fully reduce the idea to practice and
obtain a patent.86 In the same vein, where a first-in-time inventor chooses to
abandon his invention, conceal it from the public, or suppress it, a second-in-time
inventor could obtain patent rights over the invention. Accordingly, an inventor
who failed to either utilize his invention publicly or file a patent application upon it
in a timely fashion might lose patent rights to any later "inventors," although such
later inventors were clearly not original inventors. This was all done because
83. See id. ("If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the
secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his
invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the
structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive
right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any further use than what
should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it would materially retard the progress of science and the
useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.").
84. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (10 Wall.) 516, 552 (1870) (emphasis added).
85. Id ("Original and first inventors are entitled to the benefit of their inventions if they reduce the same
to practice, and seasonably comply with the requirements of the patent law in procuring letters patent for the
protection of their exclusive rights. Crude and imperfect experiments are not sufficient to confer a right to a
patent; but in order to constitute an invention, the party must have proceeded so far as to have reduced his idea
to practice, and embodied it in some distinct form.").
See also Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. at 317 ("The law is, that whoever first perfects a machine, is entitled
to the patent, and is the real inventor, although others may previously have had the idea, and made some
experiments towards putting it in practice.").
86. See Seymour, 78 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 552. ("Desertion of an invention consisting of a machine, never
patented, may be proved by showing that the inventor, after he had constructed it, and before he had reduced
it to practice, broke it up as something requiring more thought and experiment, and laid the parts aside as
incomplete.").
87. See Int'l Glass Co. v. U.S., 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969). ("The courts have consistently held that
an invention, though completed, is deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time
after completion, no steps are taken to make the invention publicly known."). Such inventors are not entitled
to patent protection over their suppressed, concealed, or abandoned inventions. See id. "Thus, failure to file a
patent application . . .; to describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document . . .; or to use the
invention publicly . .. have been held to constitute abandonment, suppression or concealment." Id. (citations
omitted).
88. See, e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (20 How.) 322, 328 (1858) (stating that if an inventor chooses
to conceal his invention, and "if, during such a concealment, an invention similar to or identical with his own
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patent rights are granted due to the benefit they bestow upon the public, rather than
to inventors.89
This requirement of reduction to practice has been misapprehended by some
critics of a "first inventor to file" system as indicating that the Supreme Court
required that patents go to original inventors. 90 While patents may indeed only be
granted for novel and non-obvious subject matter, the patentability of a particular
invention is not based on the knowledge of other private individuals. Instead, the
determination is based on the knowledge available to the public. As such, the mere
fact that an individual had conceived of a novel idea-but not shared it with the
public at large-would not preclude another who conceived of the same novel idea
and decided to share it with the public first from obtaining a patent.
The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to determine whether one may be an
"inventor" without being a "first inventor." 91 However, the Court indicated that in
determining if a patent may be obtained for a supposedly new discovery, the crucial
distinction is whether an invention was known to the public prior to the alleged
inventor's conception of the idea, rather than if another individual had previously
conceived of the idea in secret. 92  In other words, an actual inventor who had
conceived of an invention independently, without having gained knowledge from
another, could be denied a patent if the subject matter of his invention were already
known to the public.9 3 The Court provided that inventions that were already known
to the public could not be "invented" again-and thus later patented and removed
from the public domain-regardless of whether an inventor had actual knowledge
of the prior discovery.94 Justice Story described the burden on inventors as being
one of "reasonable diligence," that is, "an inventor, who has first actually perfected
should be made and patented, or brought into use without a patent, the latter could not be inhibited nor
restricted, upon proof of its identity with a machine previously invented and withheld and concealed by the
inventor from the public").
89. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518) (Justice Story
stated "[p]atents for inventions are now treated as . . . highly beneficial to the public, . . . as ultimately
securing to the whole community great advantages from the free communication of secrets, and processes,
and machinery .... ).
90. See, e.g., Suominen, supra note 61, at 644 ("It seems unlikely that the Court would have used
language so tilted toward the activities of actual reduction to practice if it had considered the Constitution to
contemplate 'inventors' as including first filers who reduced to practice after late-filing first inventors had
already undergone the 'labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions."').
91. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 513 (1818) (where the Court declined to carry out "a
critical inquiry into the accuracy with which the term invention or discovery may be applied to any other than
the first inventor," considering such investigation irrelevant based on the wording of the original Patent Act).
Prior to the passage of the America Invents Act, such a determination would not be necessary, as the patent
statutes clearly required an original inventor. However, as noted above, the Court has indicated that the term
"inventor" is not restricted to "first-in-time inventors." See, e.g., Gayler, 51 U.S. (9 How.) at 497.
92. See Evans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 514 ("Admitting the words 'originally discovered,' to be explained
or limited by the subsequent words, still if the thing had been in use, or had been described in a public work,
anterior to the supposed discovery, the patent is void.").
93. Id. (stating that when a previous public use or description of an alleged invention exists, "[i]t may be
that the patentee had no knowledge of this previous use or previous description; still his patent is void: the law
supposes he may have known it").
94. See Id. at 454-55 ("[Ihf the thing secured by patent had been in use, or had been described in a public
work anterior to the supposed discovery, the patent is void, whether the patentee had a knowledge of this
previous use or description, or not.") (emphasis added).
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his invention, will not be deemed to have surreptitiously or unjustly obtained a
patent for that, which was in fact first invented by another, unless the latter was at
the time using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same." 95 To this
end, the Court considers every inventor to constructively have knowledge of all
prior public inventions.96 In the words of Justice Marshall, if a prior use or
description of an invention exists, "[i]t may be that the patentee had no knowledge
of this previous use or previous description; still his patent is void: the law supposes
he may have known it; and the charge of the judge, which must be taken as
applicable to the testimony, goes no farther than the law." 97
As expressed in the Patent Clause itself, the essential goal underlying all patent
rights is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."9 That is, patent
rights are fundamentally different from other property rights. Patent rights are an
incentive for the individual not merely to invent, to discover something new and
useful, but rather to do so and then share it with society at large. 99 This quid pro
quo arrangement, trading a description of an invention for the right to its exclusive
use, is the foundation upon which patents draw their support. 00 To this end,
patents are secured only for limited terms in exchange for disclosing one's
invention to society as a whole. At the conclusion of the patent term, the inventor
ceases to own the invention and it becomes part of the public domain-free for all
to use and benefit from. In contrast, an explorer who discovered and thereby came
to possess new land would, upon obtaining proper title, own such property
indefinitely. 'ot
With this goal in mind, a "first to file" system is entirely consistent with the
ideals of the Framers. The Framers were opposed to the granting of monopolies in
general.102 A narrow exception was created to allow monopolies for a limited time
over new discoveries and creations solely to encourage innovation and benefit
society at large by causing new technologies and works to enter the public domain
upon the conclusion of the patent term. In fact, if an individual suppressed her
95. Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435, 438 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 11,645) (emphasis added).
96. Evans, 16 U.S. at 454-55 (1818).
97. Id at 514.
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
99. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts."'); see also Kendall, 62 U.S. at 327-28 ("It is undeniably true, that the limited and
temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the
benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and
securing that monopoly.") (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) ('The
disclosure required by the Patent Act is 'the quid pro quo of the right to exclude."') (citation omitted); see
also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Every patent must describe
an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent; one describes an invention, and, if the law's other
requirements are met, one obtains a patent.").
101. See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567 (1823) ("Discovery is the foundation of
title, in European nations . . . .").
102. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788) ("[T]he benefit of even
limited monopolies is too doubtful, to be opposed to that of their general suppression."), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff07.txt.
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discovery or failed to seek patent protection in a timely fashion, she was held to
have lost all rights to her invention. 103  In contrast, an individual does not lose
rights in property she has discovered and continuously possessed simply because
she did not seek title over the land quickly enough.104
Accordingly, the emphasis placed upon granting patent rights to first inventors
could be better understood as granting rights to first inventors to disclose their
completed inventions. An invention is not "made known" merely through its
discovery, but instead through its dissemination to society at large once it has been
fully developed. In light of this, the early definition of an "inventor" is better
understood to refer to the first individual to "bring to light" his invention through
some sort of publication (such as a filing with the Patent Office). Should an
inventor create something new, but keep it from society at large, he has not "made
it known" or "brought it to light" in the manner necessary to warrant granting him
an exclusive monopoly over it. As stressed by Justice Story, partial inventions are
not sufficient; an invention must be complete and the disclosure must be such that
another competent individual in the relevant field could duplicate the inventor's
work. 05
Congress has full power to determine the means and manners in which patents
will be granted, so long as the strict language of the Constitution is upheld.106 Only
the narrowest restriction has been placed upon Congress's use of this power. In the
words of the Supreme Court:
The powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is
plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no
restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to
modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the
rights of property in existing patents. 0 7
That is to say, the only limitation not explicitly placed on Congress by the
Constitution is that property rights of existing patentees may not be removed by an
act of Congress following the grant of their patent. This ideal of Congress
103. See, e.g., Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328 ("[T]he inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it
indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not within the
policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress. He does not promote, and, if aided in his design,
would impede, the progress of science and the useful arts.").
104. For example, rights in real property may be acquired through adverse possession; an adverse
possessor does not lose these rights if title to the property is not obtained fast enough. See , e.g., Ewing's
Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837) (setting forth the basic requirements of gaining ownership
through adverse possession).
105. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. at 438 ("[H]e is the first inventor in the sense of the act.. .who has first
perfected and adapted the same to use.. until the invention is so perfected and adapted to use, it is not
patentable. An imperfect and incomplete invention.. .not actually reduced to practice, and embodied in some
distinct machinery, apparatus, manufacture, or composition of matter, is not, and indeed cannot be, patentable
under our patent acts.").
106. See, e.g., Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ("The right to a patent is purely
statutory and Congress has full power to prescribe to whom and upon what terms and conditions a patent shall
issue.") (emphasis added).
107. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
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receiving a liberal grant of power over patents was extolled by Justice Story in the
early nineteenth century. 08  Justice Story believed that Congress's power to grant
patents was "clearly entitled to a liberal construction.,,109 The Supreme Court
affirmed this approach in the twentieth century by stating that Congress was entitled
to use its best judgment in passing laws governing patents, limited only by the
express provisions of the Constitution. 110  Furthermore, Congress may choose to
advance policy goals other than those explicitly stated in the Patent Clause.111 As
such, Congress could legitimately seek to switch to a "first inventor to file" system
so as to standardize the American patent system with those used by other nations.
This liberal limitation on Congress's power is further exemplified in the
treatment given to Copyright legislation by the Court.l12 In the words of the Court:
Although the constitution of the United States, in section 8 of
article 1, provides that the congress shall have power 'to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writing and discoveries,' yet the means for securing
such right to authors are to be prescribed by congress.
The standard imposed by the Court when reviewing intellectual property
legislation is simply whether "Congress rationally could have concluded" that the
change in law upheld a rationale underlying the Intellectual Property Clause. 114
Congress's authority under the Patent Clause is to pass laws that promote the
108. See Blanchard, 3 F. Cas. at 650 ("[Congress's] power is general, to grant to inventors; and it rests in
the sound discretion of congress to say, when and for what length of time and under what circumstances the
patent for an invention shall be granted. There is no restriction, which limits the power of congress to enact,
where the invention has not been known or used by the public.") (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Within the limits of the
constitutional grant, the Congress may ... implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy
which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.").
111. Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Congress may legitimately seek to
advance other public policy goals related to the objectives of the Patent Clause by enacting legislation
pursuant to the Clause.").
112. As discussed above, the same clause of the Constitution controls both Patent and Copyright laws.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the P Clause given by the Court as applied to Copyright law is generally
considered indicative of the Court's views regarding Patent law. See, e.g., Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890
(1971) (dissent from denial of cert) ("No distinction is made in the constitutional language between copyrights
and patents."). However, the distinction has been made that while the IP Clause has been liberally construed,
when it comes to patent law, the IP Clause will be more strictly construed. See, e.g., United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) ("Since patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy, the
rights which Congress has attached to them must be strictly construed so as not to derogate from the general
law beyond the necessary requirements of the patent statute."). Despite this, the Supreme Court's treatment of
Copyright law can be used to inform patent law, and vice versa. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
188 (2003) ("[Bjecause the Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes patents, the
Court's inquiry is significantly informed by the fact that early Congresses extended the duration of numerous
individual patents as well as copyrights.").
113. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1888).
114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
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progress of the "useful arts."115 Accordingly, when evaluating patent laws that do
not clearly conflict with the text of the Constitution, it is merely necessary to
determine whether it is reasonable to believe the law promotes the progress of the
useful arts.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, a Supreme Court case involving review of Congressional
authority under the Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court found that the phrase
"limited Times" only restricted Congress's authority such that copyright protections
must expire at some point-Congress could freely choose to extend the length of
copyright protection well beyond the life of the original copyright holder. 116In
effect, Congress was only restricted in that the term granted for copyright protection
must be finite, even allowing works that had previously "entered the public
domain," that is, works which had their copyright term expire, to regain protected
status. The Court held that when reviewing Congressional exercise of authority
under the Copyright Clause,117 substantial deference is afforded to Congress and its
actions are reviewed only to determine if they are rational.118 The Court indicated
that when a law founded in Congress's IP Clause authority "reflects judgments of a
kind Congress typically makes, judgments the Court cannot dismiss as outside the
Legislature's domain," the Court should not substitute its own judgment in place of
Congress's.119 In the words of the Court, "we are not at liberty to second-guess
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable
or arguably unwise they may be."l 20
Applying this reasoning to the Patent Clause, Congress should have the
discretion to do anything not explicitly prohibited by the IP Clause in implementing
the Patent system. Selecting which of several independent inventors should be
awarded a patent is a choice determined entirely by policy, which thereby falls
within the ample discretion granted to Congress. As indicated by the Supreme
Court in Eldred, the judiciary should be deferential in any review of the Patent
laws, and barring a clear and obvious indication that Congress has exceeded its
mandate, the judiciary should refrain from substituting its own judgment in place of
Congress's.
This conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in a more
recent decision that also dealt with Congress's power under the IP Clause: Golan v.
Holder.121 In Golan, the Supreme Court appears to find there are essentially no
restrictions imposed as to either the steps Congress may take regarding intellectual
property law or the justifications Congress may use in reaching its decisions about
how to implement such laws. In particular, the Court held that Congress is
permitted to decide to modify the intellectual property laws in order to bring the law
115. See, e.g., id. at 888 ("Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress's copyright
authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.").
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
117. The Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, and the Intellectual Property Clause all refer to the same
clause of the Constitution, article 1, section 8, clause 8. See supra note 24-25.
118. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
119. Id. at 188.
120. Id. at 208.
121. 132 S. Ct. 873.
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in the United States in line with the laws of other nations.122 Furthermore,
Congress has historically not been constrained to merely promoting the creation or
invention of new works or devices. Rather, Congress may promote other ends,
such as the dissemination of new works. In the words of the Court, "[n]othing in
the text of the Copyright Clause confines the 'Progress of Science' exclusively to
'incentives for creation'. . . [e]vidence from the founding, moreover, suggests that
inducing dissemination-as opposed to creation-was viewed as an appropriate
means to promote science."1 23
Accordingly, by examining the shift from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file
using this logic, it is clear this change would be permitted even if Congress's only
justification was to standardize the law in the United States with the laws already in
effect in other countries. Even if it is not clear what Congress's reasoning in
passing a particular intellectual property law was, the law will be found
Constitutional where Congress reasonably could have found that harmonizing the
law in the United States with other countries could promote progress in the useful
arts.124 The Court further reinforced that it would not utilize its own judgment in
place of Congress's political decisions in implementing the Patent laws.125 In the
words of the Court, the IP Clause "empowers Congress to determine the intellectual
property regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause."1 26
III. Conclusion
Read literally, the text of the Patent Clause restricts Congress's ability to grant
patents such that they may only be given to actual inventors. Although it could be
argued that the Framers originally intended patents to be awarded only to first or
original inventors, language imposing such additional limitations is conspicuously
absent from the Patent Clause of the Constitution. In other words, because the
Framers specifically refrained from explicitly restricting patent rights to original
inventors in the text of the Constitution, such a limitation should not be read post
hoc into the Patent Clause. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that Congress may use any manner not prohibited by the Constitution in
implementing the goals for patent rights contained in the Patent Clause.127 These
122. See id. at 875-876 ("In aligning the United States with other nations bound by the Berne Convention,
and thereby according equitable treatment to once disfavored foreign authors, Congress can hardly be charged
with a design to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual copyrights.").
123. Id. at 888.
124. See, e.g., id. at 889 (A law harmonizing United States law with an international convention (Beme)
was appropriate where Congress "rationally could have concluded that adherence to Bern promotes the
diffusion of knowledge" because "Congress had reason to believe [such adherence] would expand the foreign
markets available to U.S. authors and invigorate protection against piracy of U.S. works abroad, thereby
benefitting copyright-intensive industries stateside and inducing greater investment in the creative process.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
125. See id. at 887 ("Given the authority we hold Congress has, we will not second-guess the political
choice Congress made.").
126. Id. at 888.
127. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. at 6 ("Within the limits of the constitutional
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goals do not need to be directly achieved by intellectual property legislation; it is
enough for Congress to rationally believe a law will indirectly result in progress for
it to be considered Constitutional. It is particularly appropriate for Congress to
attempt to harmonize the United States intellectual property laws with the laws of
other countries, as such harmonization clearly has the potential to promote progress
and the interests of American inventors and creators. The "first inventor to file"
system implemented by the America Invents Act carries out these goals without
violating any of the Constitutional limitations imposed on Congress.
grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which
in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.").
87

